When arbitral proceedings get to the quantum phase, a question lingers in the parties’ and counsel’s mind: How may the country risk affect the damages calculation.
Should an investor who has invested in a country that has routinely expropriated investors, or that has prominent legal security issues and is known for the lack of independence of its judiciary be penalized at the quantum stage for having invested in such high-risk environment, as opposed to an investor who has invested in a country with moderate track record of respect for the rule of law?
Are investment treaties not supposed to protect foreign investors precisely against violations of international law treaty standards—including, among others, expropriation without compensation, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, full protection and security, most-favored nation treatment, and free transfers—consistent with the principle of full reparation set out by the PCIJ in Chorzow Factory? That is, by wiping out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablishing the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Should that not include projecting the lost profits that the investor would have received but for the breach of the treaty caused by the acts of State?
On the other hand, should the expectations of profits by an investor—and therefore his damages—be the same in a country with high political risk than in a country with lower risk? Tribunals have answered these questions differently. In Gold Reserve v Venezuela the tribunal ruled that “it is not appropriate to increase the country risk premium to reflect the market’s perception that a State might have a propensity to expropriate investments in breach of BIT obligations”, although the country risk premium should take into account “genuine risk . . . including political risk, other than expropriation.” By contrast, in Venezuela Holdings v Venezuela the tribunal considered that “the confiscation risk remains part of the country risk and must be taken into account in the determination of the discount rate.”
A follow up question is how do the mechanics work when a tribunal decides that the political risk should be accounted for? Asset valuation often relies on a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, where the future cash flow is discounted based on the cost of capital, which is a function of the risk of the project. That risk may be higher depending on the country where the capital is located. Thus, a higher discount rate results in a lower damages valuation. Often that discount rate is addressed through a country-risk premium (included in the cost of equity). This panel will address the above issues, and continue the discussion by analyzing various other questions, including: